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Introduction
In the centre of Paris there is a square called Place
du Chaˆtelet. Below it is the largest underground sta-
tion of the whole regional network, above ground are
crowds of passers-by and tourists. On Saturday after-
noons, for a long time there also used to be a gather-
ing of foreigners whose purposes were anything but
touristic. These were unregistered immigrants, from a
number of countries, demonstrating as part of a lar-
ger movement known as the movement of sans papiers
(literally, ‘without papers’, meaning they have no offi-
cial documents allowing or recognising their presence
in France). Officially, these people demonstrating at
the heart of the French capital did not exist.
But they did exist – in the spaces of the city. The
sans papiers are not citizens of France in the formal
sense, but they are formulating claims on the basis of
being in and of the city. They take part in all major
political demonstrations throughout France, and not
only ones concerning their own situation. The sans
papiers use urban space to pronounce their presence
and active participation in the life of the city. They
constitute themselves as political subjects in and
through space; they are acting in space, constructing
themselves as political subjects in space, but they are
also making space as there is no place for them in the
established order of things, in the city where they lead
their everyday lives. Their actions are ruptural and in-
augurative; they disrupt the established order of
things by opening up political spaces through pro-
cesses of political subjectification.
In this paper, I consider three strands of politics
that I see as ruptural and inaugurative – politics that
comes as a disruption, starting something new, open-
ing up new spaces. I engage with the works of Chantal
Mouffe, Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancie`re to dis-
tinguish between three threads in politics, which may
be called the antagonistic, beginner and equality
strands. My focus, however, is largely on the last two,
with an attempt to explore the idea of political subjec-
tivity in Arendt and Rancie`re. I focus on these two
thinkers because each, in their own particular way,
offers resources for spatially thinking politics and
political action in a way that is neither state- nor
subject-centred. What they both emphasise are the
doings rather than the beings of political actors, and
they are particularly useful when thinking about a case
like the sans papiers, who were not established political
interlocutors but managed to establish a novel form of
political subjectivity through their actions in and
through space. This implies that both Arendt and Ran-
cie`re share a commitment to avoid an understanding
of politics around given identities, and this commit-
ment is a common point between them and Mouffe.
Unlike Mouffe, however, they do not make antago-
nism central to their conceptualisation of politics.
There is as yet little geographical literature on
Arendt and Rancie`re. A brief introduction to
Arendt’s work was provided by Cloke (2002, 595–7),
who pointed to her idea of the capacity for action
and her recasting of the political as a potentially
important perspective for geographers. In an earlier
engagement, Howell observed the ‘spatial language
that pervades her writings’ (1993, 314), and saw in it
resources for interpreting historical geographies of
modernity. Her work on political action, however, has
generally been rather neglected by geographers, and
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it is this aspect of her political thought that I focus
on in this paper.
Rancie`re has found a more favourable reception in
geography, and there is now an emerging geographi-
cal literature inspired by or on his work (Dikeç 2005
2007 2012; Dixon 2009; Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw
2010; Swyngedouw 2009). A dominant theme in this
literature is the idea of the suppression of politics
(the ‘post-politics’ thesis) by established orders of gov-
ernance (what Rancie`re calls ‘the police’). This paper
shifts the emphasis from this aspect of Rancie`re’s
work, and focuses on the idea of political subjectifica-
tion. It focuses, in other words, on the constitution of
spaces of and for politics. This focus, together with
Arendt’s understanding of political action, provides
elements for thinking politics as a world-building
activity rather than as a matter of given identities and
interests. To make arguments more concrete, I use
the political mobilisation of sans papiers as an illustra-
tive example rather than a ‘case study’, and re-visit it
at the end of the paper for a re-consideration in the
light of lessons learned from Arendt and Rancie`re’s
understandings of politics.
Politics for antagonists
Both Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt used the met-
aphor of miracle in their theorisations, the former in
association with politics and action, the latter with the
state of exception. Arendt’s miracle, as we will see,
differs, unsurprisingly, from Schmitt’s in many ways.
While Schmitt (1985) uses the metaphor of the mira-
cle as part of his political theology to theorise the
state of exception, Arendt uses it to theorise a ‘post-
theological politics’, as Honig (2009) puts it. Further-
more, Arendt associates the miracle with rupture and
emphasises immanence rather than transcendence,
what Schmitt’s state of exception implies:
In what might well have been a deliberate effort to coun-
ter Schmitt, Arendt in The Human Condition associates
the miracle with rupture, but specifically with the ruptural
power of a form of political action that is immanent not
transcendent. Hers is a nonsovereign rupture that inaugu-
rates a new limitedly sovereign order rather than suspend-
ing an existing order in a way that delineates or exhibits
decisive sovereign power. (Honig 2009, 92)
Arendt and Schmitt have more similarities than one
would expect. Kateb argues that both were
devoted to the dignity of politics; to restore it, in Arendt’s
case, after the experience of world war and totalitarian
horrors; and to maintain it in a time of despondency after
German defeat and humiliation in the First World War,
with [Schmitt]. (2006, 131)
They also shared a similar concern with the centrality
of the public domain in the formation of political
identities or agents. Schmitt’s enemy ‘is not a private
adversary’, and ‘the political aspect of the friend ⁄
enemy distinction emerges only in the public domain’
(Bull 2005, 676). We will see below how Arendtian
plurality, action and politics also unfold in the public
realm by the constitution of a common ‘space of
appearance’.
But the similarities end here. Apart from a com-
mon recourse to the metaphor of miracle, a commit-
ment to the dignity of politics and an emphasis on
the public realm, Arendt and Schmitt belonged to
two opposite strands of political thought. In
Marchart’s (2007) terms, while Arendt emphasised
association through political action (by acting in con-
cert), Schmitt did the opposite and emphasised a dis-
sociative moment in politics where the political
identity of the enemy is opposed to that of friend. In
Schmitt’s framework,
there can be no association of strangers, only the associa-
tion of friends and the dissociation of enemies, and no
indetermination of ends, only the determination of death.
(Bull 2005, 675)
While Arendt emphasised plurality as a political rela-
tion, Schmitt emphasised antagonism. While miracles
opened up spaces for new beginnings for Arendt,
Schmitt’s miracle delineated space to affirm the sov-
ereign’s decisive power.
This idea of antagonism as foundational to politics
has been a central premise of the political conceptu-
alisations of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Mouffe
(1993 2005). In Mouffe’s case, however, the debt to
Schmitt (2007) is more explicit. The antagonistic crea-
tion of political identities is central to her understand-
ing of ‘radical democracy’ and politics. Politics, for
her, is not about pre-constituted identities, but about
the very constitution of identities. There are no pure,
given identities in politics; identities are processes,
not things. They are constant relationships, multiple,
shifting, situated and always in the making.
But these identities are always created negatively,
in opposition to an other, which, in the political lan-
guage of Schmitt, is the enemy. In other words, ‘the
‘‘they’’ represents the condition of possibility of the
‘‘we’’, its ‘‘constitutive outside’’, [and] this means that
the constitution of a specific ‘‘we’’ always depends on
the type of ‘‘they’’ from which it is differentiated’
(Mouffe 2005, 18–9).
The ‘we ⁄ they’ of Mouffe, however, are not in the
same space in any kind of relation: they are antagonis-
tic, the friend and the enemy, situated in opposing
camps. This derives from Mouffe’s commitment –
already present in Laclau and Mouffe (1985) – to an
understanding of ‘the political’ as ‘the dimension of
antagonism which [is] constitutive of human societies’
(2005, 9). This centrality of antagonism in founding
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politics seriously limits the scope of political subjectifi-
cation because it leaves no room for thinking forms of
politics based on cooperation, friendship and solidarity
(Featherstone 2008; Massey 2005). But there is, in my
view, another implication of this commitment. For
both Laclau and Mouffe, the political has to do with
antagonism, and their thinking is premised on the idea
that social relations are potentially antagonistic. This
means that the political is likely to be found in all
spheres of social life. Indeed, Mouffe writes that ‘every
order is political’ (2005, 18). But then, is everything
political (which comes down to saying that nothing is)?
I take Mouffe’s remark to imply not that every-
thing is political, but that every issue in a given order
can be turned into an object of contestation, into a
matter of politics. Indeed, one of the key contribu-
tions of Laclau and Mouffe has been, as Featherstone
observes, their insistence on the constitution of politi-
cal identities through political activity ‘rather than
seeing the political as an arena defined by negotia-
tions between actors with already constituted identi-
ties and interests’ (2008, 5–6). Although this
conceptualisation of politics is significant in that it
eschews an essentialist understanding of identity, it
tends to turn conflict into the foundational character-
istic of politics. Political identities are constituted only
negatively against a political enemy (the ‘constitutive
outside’), and negativity becomes ‘the deciding factor
in the constitution of political identities’ (Feather-
stone 2008, 6).
Although Mouffe resists conceiving politics around
given identities, her conceptualisation of politics is nev-
ertheless based on claims – and clashes – of identity.
Below I engage with two thinkers of politics – Arendt
and Rancie`re – whose understanding of politics is
based, rather than on a confrontation of (antagonistic)
identities, on the creation and confrontation of worlds.
They share with Mouffe the conviction that politics is
not about already given identities and interests, and
they define, in their own ways, politics as a specific
activity rather than subscribing to a view that every-
thing is political. In what follows, I focus, in particular,
on the idea of political subjectification in their under-
standing of politics. I then re-visit the movement of
sans papiers, and argue that Laclau and Mouffe’s
antagonistic model is less helpful in interpreting this
movement, which resonates strongly with the key
themes of freedom (Arendt) and equality (Rancie`re).
Politics for beginners
The miracle of freedom is inherent in this ability to make
a beginning, which itself is inherent in the fact that every
human being, simply by being born into a world that was
there before him [sic] and will be there after him, is him-
self a new beginning. (Arendt 2005, 113)9
Arendt is a theorist of beginnings. Human natality and
the miracle of beginnings are central themes in Arendt’s
conceptualisation of action and politics, especially in
The human condition. ‘[S]ince action is the political
activity par excellence’, she writes, ‘natality, and not
mortality, may be the central category of political, as
distinguished from metaphysical, thought’ (1998, 9). As
Jonas observed, with ‘natality’, Arendt ‘not only coined
a new word but introduced a new category into the
philosophical doctrine of man [sic]’ (1977, 30).
Arendt’s interest in natality, however, is not philo-
sophical but political. She sees ‘action as beginning’
as ‘the actualization of the human condition of natal-
ity’ (1998, 178):
With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came
into the world . . . It is in the nature of beginning that
something new is started which cannot be expected from
whatever may have happened before. This character of
startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings and
in all origins. (1998, 177–8)
Acting sets ‘something into motion’ (1998, 177),
resulting in something new, something ‘unexpected,
unpredictable, and ultimately causally inexplicable –
just like a miracle’ (2005, 111–2). This unexpected-
ness, she maintains, is characteristic of all beginnings:
The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of
statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical,
everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore
always appears in the guise of a miracle. The fact that
man is capable of action means that the unexpected can
be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is
infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only
because each man is unique, so that with each birth some-
thing uniquely new comes into the world. (1998, 178)1
New beginnings that Arendt associates with natality
become her way of emphasising the distinctiveness
and capacity – capacity for action, for new initiatives,
for beginning something new – of each human being.
In contrast to Heidegger’s emphasis on human mortal-
ity, Arendt focuses on natality precisely because she
wants to emphasise this human capacity for action:
If left to themselves, human affairs can only follow the law
of mortality . . . It is the faculty of action that interferes
with this law because it interrupts the inexorable automatic
course of daily life . . . The life span of man running
toward death would inevitably carry everything human to
ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of inter-
rupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is
inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men,
though they must die, are not born in order to die but in
order to begin . . . Action is, in fact, the one miracle-work-
ing faculty of man. (Arendt 1998, 246)
So this is the miracle of Arendt. Action is not only
originary, unexpected and full of surprises, it is also
emancipatory. ‘Men are free’, Arendt writes, ‘as long
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as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and
to act are the same’ (2006a, 151). But this is not at all
the kind of freedom enjoyed individually, such as the
liberal notion of the individual enjoying, say, freedom
of choice among alternatives. Freedom for Arendt is
an activity that consists in acting in the presence of
others, in human plurality. ‘We first become aware of
freedom or its opposite in our intercourse with others,
not in the intercourse with ourselves’ (2006a, 147).
And without freedom, ‘political life as such would be
meaningless. The raison d’eˆtre of politics is freedom,
and its field of experience is action’ (2006a, 145).
Arendt constantly emphasised action in the public
realm. For her, realisation of a fully human life is
only possible through action and speech in the public
realm; that is, within the plurality of others. ‘Action’,
she writes, ‘corresponds to the human condition of
plurality’, and ‘this plurality is specifically the condi-
tion . . . of all political life’ (1998, 7). Plurality, for
Arendt, is understood as a political relation and is the
basic condition of both action and speech – that is, of
politics – and has two characteristics: equality and dis-
tinctiveness. We need action and speech because we
are all equal in being distinguished from one another;
that is, in our distinctiveness.
Plurality is the condition of human action because we are
all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is
ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will
live. (Arendt 1998, 8)2
Arendtian plurality, therefore, is not a mere numeri-
cal matter; ‘plurality means that who we are is unique,
[that] we are both undeniably distinctive, and inescap-
ably more-than-one’ (Bickford 1995, 316). In another
one of her many distinctions, Arendt differentiates
between who somebody is – the specific uniqueness of
each – and what somebody is – qualities, talents,
shortcomings etc.; that is, any predicative quality that
may be used to describe and categorise people. One’s
‘who-ness’, however, is only disclosed in action and
speech in the public realm, in the plurality of others.
This public disclosure of who someone is leads Honig
to argue that Arendt offers significant resources to
those who are critical of identity-based politics as
she theorizes a democratic politics built not on already
existing identities or shared experiences but on contingent
sites of principled coalescence and shared practices of citi-
zenship. (1995a, 3)
Even though such contingent sites may arise from
shared experience,3 in each instance a political rela-
tionship is established rather than trying to turn
already given relationships or predicates into a politi-
cal identity. The promise and significance of political
action does not derive from the identity of the actor,
but from their actions. This is what Arendt shares
with Rancie`re, as we will see later on.
Moreover, this plurality is a space-making plurality,
constituting a space of appearance. Space of appear-
ance is ephemeral and contingent, not a given. It is in
this space of appearance that the acting subject
reveals to themself and others their unique distinct-
ness – ‘who’ they are. In other words, the ‘who’ of an
individual finds its expression only in plurality, only in
acting in the presence of others, whereas ‘what’ some-
one is does not require plurality. We can, therefore,
say that her understanding of political action is indi-
viduating in the sense that it is through action in the
public space that actors disclose and discover who
they are. However, this is not an individualistic or
subject-centred account since Arendt’s emphasis is on
acting ‘in concert’4 and it has nothing to do with the
given attributes of the actor; the actor is constituted
in the act of acting, not prior to it. In Honig’s words:
Prior to or apart from action, the self is fragmented, dis-
continuous, indistinct, and most certainly uninteresting. A
life-sustaining, psychologically determined, trivial, and imi-
table biological creature in the private realm, this self
attains identity – becomes a ‘who’ – by acting in the public
realm in concert with others. In so doing, it forsakes ‘what’
it is, the roles and features that define (and even deter-
mine) it in the private realm. (1993, 79–80)
Political action in the presence of others – in plurality
– is the basis of Arendt’s political subject revealing
their ‘who-ness’. It is only in the presence of others,
in action and speech, that they at once establish a
political relation with the others and affirms their dis-
tinctiveness from them. What provides human beings
that ‘mysterious talent for working miracles’ (2005,
113) is the capacity for action, which is both ruptural
and inaugurative for Arendt, working miracles in
opening up spaces that at once relate and separate
individuals.
Politics for equals
[W]here Foucault thinks in terms of limits, closure and
exclusion, I think in terms of internal division and trans-
gression. L’Histoire de la folie was about locking up ‘mad-
men’ as an external structuring condition of classical
reason. In La nuit des prole´taires, I was interested in the
way workers appropriated a time of writing and thought
that they ‘could not’ have. Here we are in a polemical
arena rather than an archaeological one. And thus it’s the
question of equality – which for Foucault had no theoreti-
cal pertinence – that makes the difference between us.
(Rancie`re 2000, 13)
In the same interview, Rancie`re described his debt to
Foucault as well:
The idea of the partition of the sensible is no doubt my
own way of translating and appropriating for my own
account the genealogical thought of Foucault – his way of
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systemizing how things can be visible, utterable, and capa-
ble of being thought. (2000, 13)
The partition of the sensible (le partage du sensible)
refers to the way a given community is ordered, both
symbolically and materially as symbolic forms of order
are also present as sensible givens. It is, however, not
only about objects, but about sense-making practices
as well: what is understood as voice or noise, what is
seen and heard, what is possible or impossible, think-
able or unthinkable. It is a spatial term Rancie`re uses
to refer to forms and modes of configuring a sensible
order that makes a certain perception of the world
possible and sensible by relating what is given to the
senses to ways of sense-making.
The word ‘partage’ is almost oxymoronic as it means
both ‘partition’ and ‘sharing’. Rancie`re uses it deliber-
ately to refer to both what is shared in common and
what is separated in a given community. The word also
implies to be endowed with something (‘en partage’),
usually positive such as talent. So another connotation
of the partition (partage) of the sensible would be to
be already given, or to have inherited, certain forms of
sensible and sense-making practices; that is, of per-
ceiving and making sense of things. All these consid-
ered together, the term partition of the sensible has
the implication of routinised perception and interpre-
tation. Politics is about disrupting these routinised sen-
sible and sense-making practices by re-configuring the
partition of the sensible.5
Such partitioning has a policing effect, and Ran-
cie`re uses the term ‘the police’ (la police) to refer to
orders of governance. The essence of the police is not
repression but distribution – the distribution, or parti-
tioning, of the sensible, of what is made available to
the senses and what is made to make sense. Whereas
Foucault treats the police as a historical phenomenon,
Rancie`re uses it to refer to various ordering regimes.
It is a governmental logic rather than a historical phe-
nomenon, though it obviously has diverse historical
concretisations and manifestations. There are various
police orders; we do not have a single police order
that is complete and immutable, produced by an
intentional project. We are not, in other words, in the
domain of totalitarianism. Policing effects can be pro-
duced as much by intentional state apparatus as by
spontaneous social relations. Any hierarchical struc-
ture that seeks to allocate and keep places, people,
names, functions, authorities, activities and so on in
their ‘proper’ place in a seemingly natural order of
things may be considered a ‘police’, a sensible order
with policing effects. Rancie`re’s politics is concerned
with situations when such effects wrong equality.
Rancie`re’s political thought rests on two premises:
radical contingency and radical equality. Radical con-
tingency means that the givens of any established
order are always polemical and never objective; there
is no reason why we should necessarily accept things
as being in their ‘proper place’. The main concern of
Rancie`re’s politics, therefore, is to ‘resist the given-
ness of place’ (Dikeç 2007, 17) – that is, not to take
as natural the distributions or partitionings of estab-
lished orders.
We have seen that politics remains a permanent
possibility because all human beings share an equal
capacity for new beginnings – according to Arendt –
and because all social relations are marked with
antagonism – according to Laclau and Mouffe. What
makes politics a permanent possibility for Rancie`re is
the coupling of this radical contingency – resisting the
givennness of place – with radical equality – the
equality of anyone with anyone.
This idea of equality, however, is axiomatic. Equal-
ity is not a goal to be achieved or something to be
granted by higher powers: it is a presupposition to be
verified and enacted by opening up stages of equality.
Rancie`re’s debt here is to a nineteenth-century
French schoolteacher exiled in the Netherlands,
Joseph Jacotot. Jacotot, who did not know Flemish,
applied a quite revolutionary pedagogical principle
when teaching his Flemish students, who did not
know French: all people have equal intelligence. As
Rancie`re showed in The ignorant schoolmaster, equal-
ity for Jacotot was not an end, but a principle; not
something that had to be tested or measured, but
something to be taken as a given. Of course, it would
be empirically wrong to claim that all intelligence is
equal, but the ‘problem isn’t proving that all intelli-
gence is equal. It’s seeing what can be done under that
supposition’ (Rancie`re 1991, 46; emphasis added).
What happens when any human being judges herself
equal to everyone else and judges everyone else equal
to them? That was the pedagogical question that
interested Jacotot. It is the political question that
interests Rancie`re and marks a major divergence from
Arendt’s understanding of politics, similarities not-
withstanding.
Politics for anyone
For Arendt, politics is not a means to an end, but an
end in itself. As Canovan put it, ‘[p]olitics is not sim-
ply a way of promoting welfare any more than ballet
is simply a way of keeping fit: it is a world in itself’
(1985, 636). What unites people when they act
together is
not a general will but . . . a common world, so that there
is room for disagreement and public debate amongst them
on what the interests of that world actually are. (1985,
639)
Zerilli offers a similar interpretation and argues that
Arendt conceives politics
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neither as a subject question nor as a social question but
as a world question, or, more precisely, as a world-building
activity, for which the pursuit of interests may be enabling
or corrupting but is, either way, certainly secondary to the
practice of freedom . . . Political are not the interests as
such but the world-building practice of publicly articulating
matters of common concern. (Zerilli 2005, 22)
As Arendt writes,
interests constitute, in the word’s most literal significance,
something which inter-est, which lies between people and
therefore can relate and bind them together. Most action
and speech is concerned with this in-between, which varies
with each group of people, so that most words and deeds
are about some worldly objective reality in addition to
being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent. Since
this disclosure of the subject is an integral part of all, even
the most ‘objective’ intercourse, the physical, worldly
in-between along with its inter-ests is overlaid and, as it
were, overgrown with an altogether different in-between
which consists of deeds and words and owes its origin
exclusively to men’s acting and speaking directly to one
another. This second, subjective in-between is not tangible,
since there are no tangible objects into which it could
solidify; the process of acting and speaking can leave
behind no such results and end products. But for all its
intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world
of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality
the ‘web’ of human relationships, indicating by the meta-
phor its somewhat intangible quality. (1998, 182–3)
There are parallels here to Rancie`re’s politics. In fact,
reading Arendt and Rancie`re together enables one to
go beyond a subject-centred understanding of politics
as neither postulates given identities as inherently
political ones. Their politics emphasises the construc-
tion of space – for acting with others, for Arendt, and
for setting a stage for the manifestation of dissensus,
for Rancie`re. For both thinkers, politics is a world-
building activity. As Rancie`re formulates it, politics is
‘not a world of competing interests or values but a
world of competing worlds’ (2003b, 7). Politics mani-
fests dissensus ‘as the presence of two worlds in one’
(2001, Thesis 8) where equality and its absence are
held together so that a wrong can be handled and
equality be demonstrated. This is what he means
when he says that political subjectification ‘consists in
putting a world within another’ and invents a form of
political relation based on the denial and affirmation
of equality rather than on given identities (2009, 242).
‘Politics is not made up of power relationships; it is
made up of relationships between worlds’ (1999, 42).
But when we consider how this understanding of
politics as world-building informs political subjectifica-
tion, differences between Arendt and Rancie`re become
more pronounced. Arendt’s world-building politics
brings individuals together around a common world:
there is a common concern – inter-est – and a public
coming together – inter-being. The political subjects of
Arendt are inter-ested (in something common to them)
and inter-related (in public through action and
speech). The ‘in-betweenness’ that she emphasises,
therefore, shows a commitment to intersubjectivity.
The ‘in-between’, however, takes on a different
meaning in Rancie`re. It is not about being interested
in the same thing or being inter-related in the public
realm. ‘Political being-together’, he writes, ‘is a being-
between: between identities, between worlds’ (1999,
137). But the ‘between’ here does not tend towards
intersubjectivity as it does for Arendt. ‘This between
is not primarily between subjects. It is between the
identities and the roles that they hold, between the
places they are assigned to and the ones they trans-
gressively occupy’ (Rancie`re 2009, 315). This is what
he calls ‘intervals of subjectification’, opened up
between given identities and places.
Although Rancie`re (2003a) admittedly shares
Arendt’s understanding of politics as a matter of
appearance based on the constitution of common
scenes rather than the negotiation of common inter-
ests, the disagreements outweigh the agreements. It is
Arendt’s implicit commitment to political capacity as
a given quality or destination that Rancie`re finds
most problematic. At the heart of this commitment
lies Arendt’s distinction between the social and the
political. For Rancie`re, Arendt is guilty of delineation
and making it the basis of particular ways of life;
more precisely, making a distinction between the
social and the political, and defining a way of life spe-
cific to the latter. There is, in Arendt’s conceptualisa-
tion of politics, a realm of political life that is
different and distinct from a realm of private life or
the realm of economic and social necessity. This com-
mitment to an idea of ‘pure politics’ not to be con-
taminated by private or social life is, for Rancie`re,
only another form of policing politics, which is pre-
cisely about such delineations and designations aimed
at defining the proper place of things and specific
ways of life (Rancie`re 2001 2004).6
Arendt’s position is perhaps best illustrated by her
interpretation of the failure of the French Revolution.
The problem, as she saw it, was that social matters
had ‘intruded’ into the public – that is to say, political
– realm, rather than staying within the private realm
where they belonged. ‘Since the revolution had
opened the gates of the political realm to the poor,
this realm had indeed become ‘‘social’’’. This intru-
sion overwhelmed and ruined the political realm,
overcame the revolutionaries (Arendt writes about
‘the ocean of suffering around’ and ‘the turbulent sea
of emotion within’ Robespierre) and first turned their
compassion into pity, and then pity into violence and
despotism. The boundlessness of the people, of the
social ‘burst upon the political domain’. The people’s
‘need was violent, and, as it were, prepolitical; it
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seemed that only violence could be strong and swift
enough to help them’ (Arendt 2006b, 80–1).
Another example that marks the difference
between Arendt and Rancie`re is the former’s remarks
on ‘the poor’. Again in On revolution, Arendt quotes
the remarks of John Adams on the misfortunes of the
poor:
The poor man’s conscience is clear; yet he is ashamed . . .
He feels himself out of the sight of others, groping in the
dark. Mankind takes no notice of him [ . . . ] In the midst
of a crowd, at church, in the market . . . he is in as much
obscurity as he would be in a garret or a cellar. He is not
disapproved, censured, or reproached; he is only not seen
. . . To be wholly overlooked, and to know it, are intolera-
ble. (2006b, 59)
For Arendt this is simply wrong: Adams’s ‘insight into
the crippling consequences of obscurity . . . could
hardly be shared by the poor themselves’ (2006b, 59).
But why not? Because even if the poor managed to
transcend necessity – an essential condition of political
freedom for Arendt – they would either give in ‘to the
boredom of vacant time’ or ‘throw open their private
houses in ‘‘conspicuous consumption’’’ rather than try-
ing to excel through public actions (2006b, 60).
For Rancie`re, these two examples testify to
Arendt’s commitment to a certain prejudice based on
an opposition between two forms of life: one that is
capable of politics, and the other doomed to repro-
duction and nothing else. The modern name for the
latter is ‘proletarian’, which originally (proletarii)
referred to ‘people who make children, who merely
live and reproduce without a name, without being
counted as part of the symbolic order of the city’
(Rancie`re 1995a, 67). It was precisely when they
claimed visibility and demonstrated political capacity
that the term became a political name:
The emancipation of the workers is not a matter of mak-
ing labour the founding principle of the new society, but
rather of the workers emerging from their minority status
and proving that they truly belong to the society, that they
truly communicate with all in a common space; that they
are not merely creatures of need, of complaint and pro-
test, but creatures of discourse and reason, that they are
capable of opposing reason with reason and of giving their
action a demonstrative form. (Rancie`re 1995b, 48)
Arendt, according to Rancie`re,
remains a prisoner of the tautology by which those who
‘cannot’ think a thing do not think it. As I understand it,
though, politics begins exactly when those who ‘cannot’ do
something show that in fact they can. (2003a, 202)
‘Sans papiers’ as a political name
Although the mobilisation of sans papiers in France
has a longer history going back to the 1970s
(Cisse´ 1999; Sime´ant 1998), it was the occupation of
Saint-Ambroise church in Paris in March 1996 that
brought the issue to the attention of a broader public.
The majority of the occupiers were from west Africa
(Mali, in particular, but also from Senegal, Maurita-
nia and Guinea), all former French colonies, part of
French West Africa. The occupation took place in a
context of increased mobilisation by native rights and
anti-racist associations in the mid-1990s (Nicholls
2011) in response to the increasingly restrictive and
repressive measures against immigrants, marked by
the passing of the second ‘Pasqua law’ in 1993 (the
first Pasqua law dates from 1986). Named after the
then-Minister of the Interior, this law restricted entry
and residence rights of foreigners with a stated aim of
‘zero immigration’.
The undocumented immigrants were particularly
hard hit by this law, which not only made their
‘regularisation’ harder and their expulsion easier, but
also deprived them of basic social protection, thus
leaving them in an extremely precarious situation. As
Cisse´ (1999) explains, many undocumented immi-
grants initially enter France through regular channels,
work, pay taxes and make their social security contri-
butions, but find themselves sans papiers when their
request for the renewal of their residency permit is
refused.7 What the second Pasqua law did was to
make social protection dependent on the ‘regularity’
of stay; even though they paid taxes and made social
security contributions for years, they were deprived of
social protection once they lost their ‘papers’.
The occupation of Saint-Ambroise ‘gave birth’, as
Panagia puts it, ‘to a new genre of political subjectiv-
ity throughout Europe: the sans papiers’ (2006, 120).
In this sense, the mobilisation of sans papiers seems
to support the idea that political identities are contin-
gently constituted rather than already given – an idea
shared by Arendt, Rancie`re, Laclau and Mouffe. In
the case of Arendt, however, which Arendt best
accounts for the actions of the sans papiers – Arendt
the theorist of statelessness, or Arendt the theorist of
‘agonistic and performative politics’, as Honig (1995b,
136) refers to her?
Krause (2008) goes the first way, and ends up, in
my view, in a political dead end. Her interpretation
of undocumented immigrants in Western Europe
through Arendt’s notion of ‘statelessness’ carries two
political difficulties: it not only re-inscribes the juridi-
cal situation of sans papiers, but it also fails to
account for their political mobilisation in a context
where their official presence was denied, making
them vulnerable and defenceless in many spheres of
social life, most prominently through exploitation in
the labour market. So, rather than a reiteration of
their situation, I favour an interpretation that
recognises their capacity for (political) action, thus
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following a central thread in Arendt’s various writ-
ings. ‘Sans papiers’ is not a description of a juridical
state, but a political name – or became so through the
actions of those who do not officially exist.
Beltra´n (2009), on the other hand, follows Arendt
the theorist of agonistic and performative politics.
She focuses on the spring 2006 demonstrations
against anti-immigrant legislation and for immigrant
rights in the United States for a reconsideration of
the ‘undocumented’. The sheer magnitude of the pro-
tests – millions of immigrants and their supporters in
hundreds of events across the United States – was sig-
nificant. What made the demonstrations even more
significant was that many of the participants were
‘illegal’ immigrants. Beltra´n’s argument is about what
constitutes the ‘success’ of the 2006 demonstrations,
‘success’ not understood as concrete returns but as
the demonstration of a political capacity by laying
claim to the public realm by undocumented and non-
citizens.
These two different approaches point, in my view,
to two political problems in interpreting the actions
of the undocumented. The first of these is related to
the figure of the undocumented as it is commonly
perceived, and the other to the consequences of their
actions. The commonly perceived figure of the undoc-
umented is partly a product of the ‘regime of
enforced invisibility’ they need to abide by, which
links them to deprivation. This creates a ‘tendency to
portray the undocumented as the personification of
poverty’ (Beltra´n 2009, 599). Although this may be
true in many cases, and could be used as a tool for
mobilisation and articulation of claims, this dominant
figure of the undocumented has a perverse political
consequence in that their political actions and aspira-
tions get ‘conflated with questions of economic sur-
vival, material need, and bodily necessity’ (Beltra´n
2009, 599). These, to be sure, are undeniably essential
issues to be addressed. The problem arises when
issues of need and necessity start to overshadow their
political capacity (or capacity for action, in Arendt’s
terms), when the undocumented are seen as people
‘to be taken care of’ and nothing more.
As Cisse´’s account suggests, a main concern – and
source of pride – for the occupiers of Saint-Ambroise
and, later, Saint-Bernard was to take matters into
their hands rather than relying on the help of associa-
tions or expecting the government to change policies.
True, there was always an aim, or hope, to obtain
‘regularisation’, but the sans papiers were also deter-
mined to express their capacity for political action as
equals, even though this capacity was denied at times,
not only by the government who initially refused to
see them as legitimate interlocutors, but also various
public figures. Monseigneur Lustiger, archbishop of
Paris, for example, publicly expressed his surprise at
seeing 300 Africans, who hardly read or spoke
French, in a church. He was convinced, as was the
then-president of the anti-racist association SOS-Ra-
cisme, that they were ‘manipulated by associations
and extreme left organisations’ (Cisse´ 1999, 55;
emphasis added). The sans papiers, however, did not
see themselves as naı¨ve victims liable to manipulation;
they were claiming ‘equality’ in terms of rights, and
they were imposing themselves as ‘interlocutors’:
The ‘clandestines’, as they were called, no longer wanted
to wait, chased, harassed, relegated to the sidelines. They
were there, physically present, clearly visible, and deter-
mined to take their destiny into their own hands, to fight
to change their situation. (Cisse´ 1999, 79 and 12)
The political challenge here is to affirm the political
capacity of the undocumented as equals without
neglecting questions of need and survival. The chal-
lenge, in other words, is to institute and retain a polit-
ical name. As Rancie`re argues with reference to
increased racism and xenophobic reactions towards
immigrants in France (responding to the same context
of the mid-1990s), part of the problem lies in the loss
of a name – the immigrant’s other, political name
when they were workers or proletarians:
The immigrant is first and foremost a worker who has lost
his [sic] name, a worker who is no longer perceptible as
such. Instead of the worker or proletarian who is the
object of an acknowledged wrong and a subject who vents
his grievance in struggle and disputation, the immigrant
appears as at once the perpetrator of an inexpiable wrong
and the cause of a problem calling for the round-table
treatment. Alternately problematised and hated, the immi-
grant is caught in a circle, one might even say a spiral: the
spiral of lost political otherness. (Rancie`re 1995b, 105)
The second political problem in interpreting the
actions of the undocumented relates to the conse-
quences of their actions, when the idea of concrete
gains start to overshadow the political nature of such
events. Beltra´n, for example, is critical of the way
debates over legalisation and low-wage labour over-
shadowed what she calls, following Arendt, ‘the pro-
found surprise’ of the actions of the demonstrators in
the 2006 protests in the United States. Although
everyday material benefits of these for the involved
cannot be denied, Beltra´n’s argument deserves atten-
tion in that it points to the profoundly political nature
of these events, which she interprets by following
Arendt:
Measuring the success of immigrant action in terms of
future participation in the electoral process, xenophobic
backlash, replicability (i.e., the ability to recapture and
recreate previous demonstrations), or immediate legislative
‘results’ limits our understanding of the significance of the
demonstrations. Such circumscribed analysis misses much
of what was democratically distinctive and politically
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consequential about noncitizens laying claim to the public
realm (Beltra´n 2009, 597)
Related to these is a common strategy, both discur-
sive and action-oriented, that seeks to establish the
undocumented as ‘worthy’ of membership by emphas-
ising their contribution to the economy as hard-
working labourers. Beltra´n argues that ‘emphasizing
labour as the way to gain political standing is, simply
put, a bad idea’ (2009, 611). Invoking economic utility
rather than political subjectivity, emphasising a capac-
ity to make an economic contribution rather than a
capacity for political action seems to me not only a
‘bad’ idea – for it contributes to the loss of the politi-
cal name of the immigrant – but a dangerous one as
well for it replaces a logic of equality with a logic of
economic value, drifting away from politics to the
police. This is a logic that constructs subjects – rather
than political subjectivities – on the basis of quantifi-
able, calculable contributions. But calculation of eco-
nomic utility requires calculation of costs. On 1
March 2010, inspired by the 2006 demonstration in
the United States, a ‘day without immigrants’ (‘journ-
e´e sans immigre´s’) was organised in France, which
consisted in immigrants ‘withdrawing’ from economic
activity to show their contribution.8 The mobilisations
and the following debates – when there were any –
were modest. A few weeks after this demonstration,
Eric Besson, the then-Minister of Immigration, Inte-
gration and National Identity, announced an audit to
calculate the cost of sans papiers, including the cost of
their accommodation, health care, schooling and the
legal assistance they receive in retention centres
(Le Canard enchaıˆne´ 2010). This is the logical
extreme of focusing on economic utility that points to
the perils of following a logic that seems characteristic
more of governing orders than of democratic action,
which could be quite detrimental to the cause of the
undocumented in the long term. As Beltra´n helpfully
clarifies the point criticising political actions organised
merely around a narrative of the efficacy of labour is
not to neglect or dismiss the work of activists, but to
emphasise that
the undocumented are much more than their labour. Like
all human beings living in conditions of plurality, the
undocumented are men, women, and children who have
ideas, intelligences, judgements, insights, perceptions, wit,
personalities, opinions, political beliefs, and civic capaci-
ties. They are so much more than the work that they do.
(2010, 882)
Actors, Arendt maintained, have the freedom and
power for new beginnings, for bringing ‘something
into being which did not exist before’ by acting with
others in the public realm. It is in this sense that she
saw political action as establishing new relations and
creating new realities – new worlds (2006a, 150;
1998). The movement of the sans papiers was a new
beginning in an Arendtian sense: individuals acting in
freedom,
the freedom to call something into being, which did not
exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of
cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly
speaking, could not be known. (Arendt 2006a, 150)
This is the Arendtian dimension of the emergence of
this new political subjectivity, which was created
through the actions of individuals who did not offi-
cially exist, who, nevertheless, were present in a
‘space of appearance’. Space of appearance, then, is
not only a space where subjectivity is disclosed, but
also one where political subjectivity is produced.
But here a conceptual problem emerges within the
Arendtian scheme. In The origins of totalitarianism,
Arendt famously discusses ‘rightlessness’ and the ‘per-
plexities’ of human rights. The first loss of the right-
less is the loss of home, which means ‘the loss of the
entire social texture into which they were born and in
which they established for themselves a distinct place
in the world’ (1968, 293). This is quite significant
politically; as Arendt goes on to explain, being
deprived of rights is ‘first and above all [being
deprived] of a place in the world that makes opinions
significant and actions effective’ (1968, 296). That
means those who are deprived of their rights ‘are
deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right
to action; not of the right to think whatever they
please, but of the right to opinion’, losing, therefore,
their distinct place in the world where ‘one is judged
by one’s actions and opinions’ (1968, 296–7; emphasis
added). This would have dramatic effects for Arend-
tian politics – indeed, in a case of ‘rightlessness’, as
she defines it, there would be no Arendtian politics
for action, opinion and speech are the core elements
of political life for her. We have already seen this
above; realisation of a fully human life is only possi-
ble through action and speech in the public realm,
which makes freedom and political life possible: ‘Men
are free . . . as long as they act, neither before nor
after; for to be free and to act are the same [ . . . ] The
raison d’eˆtre of politics is freedom, and its field of
experience is action’ (2006a, 151 and 145). Rightless-
ness equals deprivation from politics – from speech,
action and appearance in the public realm. How then
do we account for the actions and political claims of
the sans papiers? Or, in Schaap’s apt formulation,
[i]f statelessness corresponds not only to a situation of
rightlessness but also to a life deprived of public appear-
ance, how could those excluded from politics publicly claim
the right to have rights, the right to politics? (2011, 33)
According to Rancie`re (2001), the way Arendt identi-
fies politics with a specific way of life turns out to be
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a ‘vicious circle’, produced, in Schaap’s words, by her
‘ontological assumptions’:
whereas Arendt views ‘the human’ in human rights
ontologically as a life deprived of politics, Rancie`re
views ‘the human’ polemically as the dismissal of any dif-
ference between those who are qualified to participate in
politics and those who are not. (2011, 23; see also Schaap
2012)
As we have seen, Arendt seems to privilege only
certain modes and spheres of action as properly
‘political’, instilling, therefore, a fundamental division,
which for Rancie`re is precisely what politics is about.
This is why he takes issue with Aristotle’s definition
of the political animal as a speaking animal – a com-
monly shared human capacity of speech and discus-
sion in distinction from an animal capacity to make
noises that can merely express pain or pleasure. But
even this allegedly ‘common’ capacity, Rancie`re
argues, is ‘split up from the very beginning’:
Aristotle tells us that slaves understand language but don’t
possess it. This is what dissensus means. There is politics
because speaking is not the same as speaking, because
there is not even agreement on what a sense means. Politi-
cal dissensus is not a discussion between speaking people
who would confront their interests and values. It is a con-
flict about who speaks and who does not speak, about
what has to be heard as the voice of pain and what has to
be heard as an argument on justice. (2003b, 1–2)
While this fundamental division Aristotle establishes
negates speaking as a common human capacity, it
affirms another commonality for there is a ‘primary
contradiction’ here: slaves must be able to understand
their orders and they must also be able to understand
that they must obey them. ‘And to do that, you must
already be the equal of the person who is ordering
you. It is this equality that gnaws away at any natural
order’ (Rancie`re 1999, 16). Politics, therefore, exists
not because we are distinct in our faculty of speech,
but because those who are not counted as capable of
speech make themselves count as speaking beings by
enactments of equality. It is not about a specific way
of life; politics is the affair of anyone and no one in
particular. ‘[T]here is no political life’, he insists, ‘but
a political stage’ (2003b, 3). Even those deprived of
rights, those who are indeed unrepresentable, are
then capable of opening up political spaces for enact-
ments and verifications of equality.
And this is precisely what the sans papiers did: not
only did they manifest their equality as political sub-
jects, they did so in a context of inequality, thus dem-
onstrating how the established order ‘wronged’ this
equality. They wanted to demonstrate the process of
becoming sans papiers, rather than simply being one,
through administrative regulations and procedures.
On reflecting back on the use of the term ‘sans
papiers’, Cisse´ (2007) recalls that their aim was to
invent a term (although it was not entirely novel) that
made clear that their situation was produced by the
administration’s denial of their rights. This was, in
Rancie`re’s terms, putting two worlds in one where the
equality and inequality of sans papiers existed
together:
Our claims were highly political. Our visibility in demon-
strations, meetings, occupations, the debates we organised,
made them uncomfortable. For ‘illegals’ or ‘clandestines’
to occupy a significant part of the public stage was, for the
government, more than troubling, a lengthy disturbance of
political life, it gave too ‘uncivilised’ an image of social
life. For French people to claim rights, that was accept-
able, only just! But for foreigners to do so, and above all
‘sans papiers’ to do so, that was too much. (Cisse´ 1999, 81)
The sans papiers, in this account, attempted to dis-
close the processes through which an established
order of governance denied them equality, which they
were showing they were capable of enacting. The con-
stitution of sans papiers’ political subjectivity was not
decided by negativity, defined strictly against a con-
stitutive outside (which, of course, does not mean that
there was no antagonism). A will to take matters in
hand as equal political actors was a generative factor,
and in this sense the constitution of sans papiers’
political subjectivity resonates more strongly with the
Arendtian understanding of political action as realisa-
tion of freedom and Rancie`re’s emphasis on the veri-
fication of equality, rather than the antagonistic
model of Laclau and Mouffe.
Conclusions
Both Arendt and Rancie`re offer, in their particular
ways, a conceptualisation of politics as a specific mode
of activity in order to avoid the trap of its dissolution
in abundance (‘everything is political’). It is true that
defining politics as a specific form of activity rules out
many things that routinely go on under the name of
politics (municipal politics, associations, local lobby
groups), but it does not deny them. It just points out
that as long as such processes have already defined
institutional settings and procedures, as long as the
interlocutors are already identified and recognised, we
are no longer in the domain of politics – not that any
such domain exists in advance – but in the places of
the police, to use Rancie`re’s term. How can we think
about politics and political subjectivity when one has
no place in such orderings of the community? When,
in other words, one does not count as part of it? An
attempt to think politics in its specificity, in my view,
has the merit of broadening our imagination for
political action and political subjectification, stretching
it more than a ‘politics as usual’ thinking could
possibly do.
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But there is, in such an attempt, also the risk of
going to the other extreme of ‘purity of politics’, an
understanding of politics as something that should
have its own specific realm, not to be contaminated
by social or private matters. Arendt, as we have seen,
goes this way. She is particularly concerned with poli-
tics ‘done in the right spirit’, as Kateb (2001 2006)
calls it; that is,
when done for its own sake, when done as display or per-
formance, when done at the behest of a ‘principle’, when
done for the sheer exhilaration of acting, of starting some-
thing new or adventuring on something unprecedented.
(Kateb 2001, 126)
Arendt’s politics expresses freedom rather than a
given identity; it is a medium of freedom as individu-
als are freed from ‘what’ they are through political
action, which makes them discover and disclose ‘who’
they are. The political realm, writes Arendt, is ‘the
only realm where men can be truly free’ (2006b, 104).
But this freedom comes with too many qualifiers. As
McGowan puts it:
Political freedom is not just freedom from necessity, free-
dom from being ruled over by others (within the polis or
ring-wall all are equal), and freedom from violence. Politi-
cal freedom begins when these basic freedoms are made
possible by conditions of abundance. (1997, 273)
But even in conditions of abundance, when, that is,
freed from necessity, the poor, as Arendt saw them,
did not really engage in public and political matters,
for they were absorbed by private consumption or
they were simply getting bored. There is, therefore, in
Arendt a major partitioning of the polis, distinguish-
ing between those who are capable of engaging in
politics and making public appearances, and those
who are not. There is a political life different and dis-
tinct from social life. This partitioning, however, is at
odds with her much more promising account of
action. As Honig observes, Arendt’s
confinement of action to certain permissible sites and
objects conflicts with her own theorisation of action.
Action is, after all, boundless, excessive, uncontrollable,
unpredictable, and self-surprising . . . If action is boundless
and excessive, why should it respect a public–private dis-
tinction that seeks, like a law of laws, to regulate and con-
tain it without ever allowing itself to be engaged or
contested by it? (1993, 119)
For Rancie`re, politics is precisely about such partiti-
onings. Like Arendt, Rancie`re also refuses to con-
ceive politics around already given identities. A
political subjectification for him is
a disidentification, removal from the naturalness of a
place, the opening up of a subject space where anyone can
be counted since it is the space where those of no account
are counted, where a connection is made between having
a part and having no part. (1999, 36)
This means that political subjects are not created
ex nihilo, and that politics, rather than taking place in
specific realms, is in fact a space-making action that
blurs – rather than abides by – divisions. Rancie`re’s
politics is excessive; political subjects are excessive
subjects that come as a surplus to an order that does
not count them. But this excess is not numerical.
They are excessive in their subjectification, in their
constitution of themselves as political subjects.
Reading Arendt and Rancie`re together provides
different ways of thinking about politics and political
action that is not subject-centred. Their understanding
of politics does not postulate any given identities.
What they emphasise as central to politics – freedom
and capacity for action, for Arendt, and equality, for
Rancie`re – has to do with actions rather than the
given identity of the actors. Freedom is realised in
action, when acting with others and beginning some-
thing new; equality is taken as a given to be verified
in actual instances of staging it.
The sans papiers who occupied the churches in the
spring of 1996 were beginners and equals. If there is
one message of hope that may be taken from both
Arendt and Rancie`re, it is that politics eludes and
defies bureaucratised subjectivities. More stretching
of the political imagination may be necessary, but as
the recent political mobilisations throughout the
world demonstrate, the spaces of the thinkable and
possible are not exhausted.
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Notes
1 Arendt is usually taken to criticise social concerns and
favour heroic action. Although she does make a distinc-
tion between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’, she does not
blindly suggest action for action’s sake as inherently
political and preferable. As Canovan (1998) reminds us,
one of the main concerns of Arendt in The human con-
dition is the dangers of action; once initiated, once set in
motion, new processes can lead to consequences that are
beyond the actors’ control. Simply put, action and poli-
tics are unpredictable (though we can always begin
something new to interrupt [...them]). As Cooper put it,
‘human affairs initiated by beginners within a plurality of
others are subject to the calamities that arise out of the
unpredictability, boundlessness, and irreversibility of
action’ (1976, 161).
2 That said, it also must be noted that some of Arendt’s
own writings seemed to deny equal capacity and
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legitimacy for political action to certain groups, Africans
and African Americans in particular. This is a depressing
and embarrassing aspect of some of her writings. As
Norton wrote:
Arendt’s easy dismissal of African history, African literatures,
African languages; her readiness to ascribe academic inferiority
to black students, and squalor, crime, and ignorance to the
black community, are innocent of evidence. They evince an
uncharacteristic, and profound, indifference to the historical
record and to the literature available on these subjects in her
time. They represent so dramatic a departure from the schol-
arly and civil character of her work as a whole that one might
read them as an aberration, and pass over them in silence.
(1995, 248)
Norton’s point is precisely not to pass over those in
silence, and her chapter provides an excellent critical
overview of the kind of racial politics expressed in
Arendt’s writings.
3 ‘Our group identities may subject us to stereotyped attention,
but they are often also where we ‘‘draw our strength to live
and our reasons for acting’’ [quoting Simone de Beauvoir]. Our
colour, ethnicity, gender, class, or religion may be a constitu-
tive part of our public identity because they are the contexts in
which we learned to speak and think the languages that shape
us and enable us to give voice to our unique selves. And it is
within particular social groups that we first are paid attention
to, and learn to attend to others – the very capacities necessary
for an Arendtian politics’ (Bickford 1995, 320).
4 Villa (2001) argues that Arendt’s definition of political
action as acting together in concert does not necessarily
imply that she is advocating a solidaristic model of polit-
ical action, not simply because Arendt was highly scepti-
cal of such models herself, but also because this would
neglect one of the central notions of her understanding
of political life: worldliness.
5 For an account of the aesthetic implications of this dis-
ruption, see Dikeç (2012).
6 Marchart offers another interpretation, and attributes
Arendt’s derogatory remarks of ‘the social’ to her ‘anti-
foundationalist’ stance. From this perspective, Arendt
excluded categories of the social from her conceptualisa-
tion of politics because these were figures of foundation.
This is understandable from an ‘anti-foundationalist’
perspective, because politics ‘cannot be grounded in
anything outside itself’ (2007, 46).
7 Madjigue`ne Cisse´ was part of the group that occupied
Saint-Ambroise, and then Saint-Bernard churches. She
was one of the spokespeople for the Saint-Bernard col-
lective.
8 The official website of the movement is http: ⁄ ⁄www.
la-journee-sans-immigres.org ⁄ Accessed 25 January 2012.
9 Arendt uses gendered language throughout her work
when intending to refer to humanity in general. This will
not be explicitly marked up in all cases, but should be
taken as reflecting Arendt’s original usage.
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